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Abstract. A survey of paraconsistent logics that are prominent repre-
sentatives of the different approaches that have been followed to develop
paraconsistent logics is provided. The paraconsistent logics that will be
discussed are an enrichment of Priest’s logic LP, the logic RM3 from the
school of relevance logic, da Costa’s logics Cn, Jas´kowski’s logic D2, and
Subrahmanian’s logics Pτ . A deontic logic based on the first of these log-
ics will be discussed as well. Moreover, some proposed adaptations of the
AGM theory of belief revision to paraconsistent logics will be mentioned.
1 Introduction
Paraconsistent logics are those logics that do not have the property that any
formula can be deduced from every set of hypotheses that contains contradic-
tory formulas. The paraconsistent logics that have been proposed differ in many
ways. The differences are mostly minor, but occasionally major. Whether one
paraconsistent logic is more plausible than another is fairly difficult to make out.
A logic with the property that any formula can be deduced from every set of
hypotheses that contains contradictory formulas but one is far from a reasonable
paraconsistent logic. Such a logic is in a certain sense a minimal paraconsistent
logic. In a quest for paraconsistent logics that are maximally paraconsistent,
many different paraconsistent logics have been proposed. Some of them are in
fact maximally paraconsistent in a well-defined sense. However, there are other
properties than maximal paraconsistency that are usually considered character-
istic of reasonable paraconsistent logics. Among them is the property that the
logic concerned does not validate deductions forbidden by classical logic that are
not essential for paraconsistency. There are also less technical properties that are
sometimes considered important. Among them are the ease with which the ax-
iom schemas and inference rules of the logic concerned can be memorized and
the ease with which the semantics of the logic concerned can be memorized.
As a rule, survey articles and handbook chapters on the subject of para-
consistent logic concentrate on explaining the nature of and motivation for the
subject, giving a history of the subject, and/or surveying the basic techniques
used to develop paraconsistent logics (see e.g. [52,55]). Individual paraconsistent
logics proposed in the scientific literature are only touched to illustrate the tech-
niques explained. The exceptions where a survey of several paraconsistent logics
is provided, concentrate on discussing logics that have been developed following
a particular approach (see e.g. [14,31]). Gaining a basic understanding of a num-
ber of different paraconsistent logics and their interrelationships still requires an
extensive study of scientific publications which contain many theoretical details
that are not relevant to a basic understanding.
In this note, a survey of paraconsistent logics that are prominent represen-
tatives of the different approaches that have been followed to develop paracon-
sistent logics is provided. The survey is made so as to allow for gaining a basic
understanding of the logics in question and their interrelationships. For each
approach, the logic that has been selected as the prominent representative is one
of the representatives for which the number of publications about work on it
and/or the number of publications that cite the publications about work on it is
relatively high. In a strict sense, the survey covers only a rather narrow group of
paraconsistent logics. However, it is not so narrow as it seems at first, because
the selected representative for each approach is in general closely related to most
other representatives of the approach concerned.
The different approaches that have been followed to develop paraconsistent
logics are:
– the three-valued approach: classical logic is turned into a logic based on three
truth values: true, false and both-true-and-false;
– the relevance approach: classical logic is adapted to the idea that the an-
tecedent of an implication must be relevant to its consequent;
– the non-truth-functional approach: classical logic is turned into a logic based
on a non-truth-functional version of negation;
– the non-adjunctive approach: classical logic is adapted to the idea that the
inference of A ∧B from A and B must fail;
– the annotation approach: classical logic is changed into a logic where atomic
formulas are annotated with believed truth values.
The representative of these approaches that will be discussed in this note are
LP⊃, which is Priest’s logic LP [51] enriched with an implication connective for
which the standard deduction theorem holds, the logic RM3 [5] from the school
of relevance logic, da Costa’s logics Cn [27], Jas´kowski’s logic D2 [42,41], and
Subrahmanian’s logics Pτ [32], respectively.
Only propositional logics will be discussed. Details about the extensions of
LP⊃, RM3, Cn and Pτ to the corresponding predicate logics can be found in [55],
[37], [31] and [3], respectively.1 These extensions are exactly as to be expected if
universal quantification and existential quantification are regarded as generalized
conjunction and generalized disjunction, respectively. Therefore, their discussion
adds little to a basic understanding.
The survey of paraconsistent logics provided in this note stems from interest
in modelling legal reasoning. However, legal reasoning is not only reasoning in
1 In [31], reference is made to several publications in which a formulation of D2 can be
found. All formulations concerned, as well as the one in [45], are incorrect (cf. [25]).
Consequently, the formulations of the extension of D2 to a predicate logic that can
be found in some of these publications are incorrect as well.
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the presence of inconsistent information, but also reasoning concerned with nor-
mative expressions such as obligatory, permissible, and prohibited. Therefore, a
deontic logic based on one of the paraconsistent logics discussed in the survey,
LP⊃, is discussed in this note as well. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that
legal reasoning is done by rational persons who revise their beliefs in the light of
new information. For that reason, proposed adaptations of the main theory of
belief revision, the AGM theory, to paraconsistent logics and other work relevant
to belief revision in the presence of inconsistent beliefs are also mentioned.
2 Preliminaries
Each logic that will be discussed in this note has the following logical connec-
tives: an implication connective ⊃, a conjunction connective ∧, a disjunction
connective ∨, and a negation connective ¬.2 Bi-implication is in all cases defined
as an abbreviation: A≡B stands for (A⊃B) ∧ (B ⊃A).
In LP⊃, RM3, Cn and D2, the formation rules for formulas are the same as
in classical propositional logic. Hence, the languages of LP⊃, RM3, Cn and D2
are identical. In Pτ , the formation rules for formulas differ in that the atomic
formulas are annotated propositional variables instead of propositional variables.
For each logic that will be discussed in this note, a Hilbert-style formulation
will be given. In those formulations, A, B and C will be used as meta-variables
ranging over all formulas of the logic concerned.
In the case of a Hilbert-style formulation, a proof of a formula A from a set
of formulas Γ in a logic L is a sequence of formulasending with A such that each
formula in the sequence is either an axiom, or a formula in Γ , or a formula that
follows from previous formulas in the sequence by one of the rules of inference.
The logical consequence relation of a logic L, denoted by ⊢L, is the binary
relation between sets of formulas and formulas defined as follows: Γ ⊢L A iff
there exists a proof of A from Γ in L.
A logic L is called a paraconsistent logic if its logical consequence relation
⊢L satisfies the condition that there exist a set Γ of formulas of L and formulas
A and B of L such that Γ ⊢L A and Γ ⊢L ¬A, but not Γ ⊢L B.
3 Priest’s Paraconsistent Logic LP⊃
In [51], Priest proposes the paraconsistent propositional logic LP (Logic of Para-
dox). The logic LP⊃ introduced in this section is LP enriched with an implication
connective for which the standard deduction theorem holds. This logic is also
known under the following names: PAC [16], PIs [20] and pure CLuNs [21]. The
fragment without the implication connective was already suggested by Asenjo
in 1966 (see [15]).
A Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃ is given in Table 1. In this formulation,
2 Each of the connectives is requisite in the formulation of a representative of at least
one of the approaches mentioned in Section 1.
3
Table 1. Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃
Axiom Schemas :
A⊃ (B ⊃ A)
(A⊃ (B ⊃C))⊃ ((A⊃B)⊃ (A⊃ C))
((A⊃B)⊃A)⊃ A
(A ∧B)⊃ A
(A ∧B)⊃B
A⊃ (B ⊃ (A ∧B))
A⊃ (A ∨B)
B ⊃ (A ∨B)
(A⊃ C)⊃ ((B ⊃ C)⊃ ((A ∨ B)⊃ C))
Rule of Inference :
A A⊃B
B
¬¬A≡ A
¬(A⊃B)≡ A ∧ ¬B
¬(A ∧ B)≡ ¬A ∨ ¬B
¬(A ∨ B)≡ ¬A ∧ ¬B
A ∨ ¬A
which is taken from [16], A, B, and C are used as meta-variables ranging over all
formulas of LP⊃,F. The axiom schemas on the left-hand side of Table 1 and the
single inference rule (modus ponens) constitute a Hilbert-style formulation of the
positive fragment of classical propositional logic. The first four axiom schemas
on the right-hand side of Table 1 allow for the negation connective to be moved
inward. We get a sound and complete formulation of the propositional part of
the paraconsistent logic N−, which was proposed by Nelson in [50], if we add
these axiom schemas to a Hilbert-style formulation of the positive fragment of
intuitionistic propositional logic. The fifth axiom schema on the right-hand side
of Table 1 is the law of the excluded middle. This axiom schema can be thought
of as saying that, for every proposition, the proposition or its negation is true,
while leaving open the possibility that both are true. If we add the axiom schema
¬A⊃(A⊃B), which says that any proposition follows from a contradiction, to the
given Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃, then we get a Hilbert-style formulation
of classical propositional logic (see e.g. [16]).
We use the symbol ⊢LP⊃ to denote the syntactic logical consequence relation
induced by the axiom schemas and inference rule of LP⊃,F.
The following outline of the semantics of LP⊃ is based on [16]. Like in the
case of classical propositional logic, meanings are assigned to the formulas of
LP⊃ by means of valuations. However, in addition to the two classical truth
values t (true) and f (false), a third meaning b (both true and false) may be
assigned.
A valuation for LP⊃ is a function ν from the set of all formulas of LP⊃ to
the set {t, f, b} such that for all formulas A and B of LP⊃:
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ν(A ⊃B) =
{
t if ν(A) = f
ν(B) otherwise,
ν(A ∧B) =


t if ν(A) = t and ν(B) = t
f if ν(A) = f or ν(B) = f
b otherwise,
ν(A ∨B) =


t if ν(A) = t or ν(B) = t
f if ν(A) = f and ν(B) = f
b otherwise,
ν(¬A) =


t if ν(A) = f
f if ν(A) = t
b otherwise.
The classical truth-conditions and falsehood-conditions for the logical connec-
tives are retained. Except for implications, a formula is classified as both-true-
and-false exactly when when it cannot be classified as true or false by the clas-
sical truth-conditions and falsehood-conditions. The definition of a valuation
given above shows that the logical connectives of LP⊃,F are (three-valued) truth-
functional, which means that each n-ary connective represents a function from
{t, f, b}n to {t, f, b}.
For LP⊃,F, the semantic logical consequence relation, denoted by LP⊃ , is
based on the idea that a valuation ν satisfies a formula A if ν(A) ∈ {t, b}. It is
defined as follows: Γ LP⊃ A iff for every valuation ν, either ν(A
′) = f for some
A′ ∈ Γ or ν(A) ∈ {t, b}. We have that the Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃,F is
strongly complete with respect to its semantics, i.e. Γ ⊢LP⊃ A iff Γ LP⊃ A (see
e.g. [21]).
The following properties of LP⊃, shown in [12], suggest that LP⊃ retains as
much of classical propositional logic as possible:
– containment in classical logic: ⊢LP⊃ ⊆ ⊢CL;
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– proper implication: for all sets Γ of formulas of LP⊃ and all formulas A and
B of LP⊃: Γ ∪ {A} ⊢LP⊃ B only if Γ ⊢LP⊃ A⊃B;
– weakly maximal paraconsistency relative to classical logic: for all formulas A
of LP⊃ with ⊢CL A and not ⊢LP⊃ A, for the minimal consequence relation
⊢′ such that ⊢LP⊃ ⊆ ⊢
′ and ⊢′ A, for all formulas B of LP⊃, ⊢′ B iff ⊢CL B;
4
– strongly maximal absolute paraconsistency: for all propositional logics L with
a consequence relation ⊢′ such that ⊢LP⊃ ⊂ ⊢
′, L is not paraconsistent.
These properties make LP⊃ an ideal paraconsistent logic in the sense made
precise in [12].
We get the following logics if we enrich LP⊃ with a constant for f, with a
constant for b or with constants for both:
– LP⊃,F is LP⊃ extended with a constant F and the axiom schema F ⊃ A.
Valuations ν for LP⊃,F are such that ν(F) = f.
3 We write ⊢CL for the logical consequence relation of classical propositional logic.
4 Let ⊢ be a logical consequence relation. Then we write ⊢ A for ∅ ⊢ A.
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– LP⊃,B is LP⊃ extended with a constant B and the axiom schemas A ⊃ B
and A⊃ ¬B. Valuations ν for LP⊃,B are such that ν(B) = b.
– LP⊃,F,B is LP⊃ extended with constants F and B and the axiom schemas
F ⊃A, A ⊃ B and A ⊃ ¬B. Valuations ν for LP⊃,F,B are such that ν(F) = f
and ν(B) = b.
The enrichments in question result in increase of expressive power. Below, the
properties of {t, f}-closure and {b}-freeness are used to characterize the expres-
sive power of the different logics:
– a function g from {t, f, b}n to {t, f, b} is {t, f}-closed if the image of the
restriction of g to {t, f}n is {t}, {f} or {t, f};
– a function g from {t, f, b}n to {t, f, b} is {b}-free if the image of the re-
striction of g to {b}n is {b}.
The expressive power of LP⊃, LP⊃,F, LP⊃,B and LP⊃,F,B can now be character-
ized as follows:
– a function g from {t, f, b}n to {t, f, b} is representable in the language of
LP⊃ iff it is {t, f}-closed and {b}-free;
– a function g from {t, f, b}n to {t, f, b} is representable in the language of
LP⊃,F iff it is {t, f}-closed;
– a function g from {t, f, b}n to {t, f, b} is representable in the language of
LP⊃,B iff it is {b}-free;
– every function g from {t, f, b}n to {t, f, b} is representable in the language of
LP⊃,F,B, i.e. the language of LP⊃,F,B is functionally complete.
With the exception of ∨ and ∧, each of the connectives in {¬,∨,∧,⊃,F,B} is not
definable in terms of the rest. The connectives ∨ and ∧ are definable in terms of
{¬,⊃,F,B}. The preceding discussion of the expressive power of LP⊃ and some
enrichments thereof is based on [17].
Note that, in LP⊃,F and LP⊃,F,B, a constant T for t can simply be defined by
T = ¬F. Note further that the consistency of a formula A cannot be represented
in LP⊃ and LP⊃,B, but that it can be represented in LP⊃,F and LP⊃,F,B by the
formula (A ⊃ F) ∨ (¬A ⊃ F).5 The properties that make the logic LP⊃ an ideal
paraconsistent logic in the sense of [12] carry over to LP⊃,F, LP⊃,B and LP⊃,F,B
(see e.g. [12]). LP⊃,F is essentially the same logic as J3 [35,34] (see e.g. [24]).
4 Interlude: LP⊃ and its Dual
It was mentioned in Section 3 that, if we add the axiom schema ¬A⊃ (A ⊃ B)
to the given Hilbert-style formulation of LP⊃, then we get a Hilbert-style for-
mulation of classical propositional logic. If we replace the axiom schema A∨¬A
by the axiom schema ¬A ⊃ (A ⊃ B) in the given Hilbert-style formulation of
5 In the setting of da Costa’s logics Cn, which will be discussed in Section 6, the
consistency of a formula is called the well-behavedness of a formula.
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LP⊃ instead, then we get a Hilbert-style formulation of Kleene’s strong three-
valued logic [43] enriched with an implication connective for which the standard
deduction theorem holds. We use K⊃3 to denote this logic. K
⊃
3 can be considered
to be the dual of LP⊃. All differences between these two logics can be traced to
the fact that the third truth value b is interpreted as both true and false in LP⊃
and as neither true nor false in K⊃3 .
Like in the case of LP⊃, meanings are assigned to the formulas of K⊃3 by
means of valuations that are functions from the set of all formulas of K⊃3 to the
set {t, f, b}. The conditions that a valuation for K⊃3 must satisfy differ from the
conditions that a valuation for LP⊃ must satisfy only with respect to implication:
ν(A⊃B) =
{
ν(B) if ν(A) = t
t otherwise.
The logical consequence relation of K⊃3 , denoted by ⊢K⊃
3
, is the binary relation
between sets of formulas of K⊃3 and formulas of K
⊃
3 defined as usual: Γ ⊢K⊃
3
A
iff there exists a proof of A from Γ in K⊃3 . We have that Γ ⊢K⊃
3
A iff for every
valuation ν, either ν(A′) ∈ {f, b} for some A′ ∈ Γ or ν(A) = t.
In [10], a logic with four truth values (t, f, b and n), called BL⊃, is proposed
in which both LP⊃ and K⊃3 can be simulated (see e.g. [11]). This means in the
case of LP⊃ that Γ ⊢LP⊃ A iff Γ ∪ {P1 ∨ ¬P1, . . . , Pn ∨ ¬Pn} ⊢BL⊃ A, where
{P1, . . . , Pn} is the set of all propositional variables in Γ ∪ {A}.
5 The Relevance Logic RM3
The three-valued relevance-mingle logic RM3 [5] is the strongest logic among the
logics that have been proposed by the school of relevance logic. Relevance logics
are based on the idea that the antecedent of an implication must be relevant
to its consequent. Although the meaning of relevance is nowhere made precise,
it is a characteristic feature of a relevance logic that propositions of the forms
A⊃ (B ⊃A) and A⊃ (¬A⊃B) do not belong to its theorems. This means that
every relevance logic is a paraconsistent logic.
A Hilbert-style formulation of RM3 is given in Table 2. If we remove the last
two axiom schemas on the right-hand side of Table 2 from the given Hilbert-style
formulation of RM3, then we get a Hilbert-style formulation of the well-known
logic R [5]. The axiom schema A⊃ (A⊃A) is known as the mingle axiom. If we
add the axiom schema A⊃ (B ⊃A), which generalizes the mingle axiom, to the
given Hilbert-style formulation of RM3, then we get a Hilbert-style formulation
of classical propositional logic (see e.g. [36]).
The following outline of the semantics of RM3 is based on [16]. Like in the case
of LP⊃, meanings are assigned to the formulas of RM3 by means of valuations
that are functions from the set of all formulas of RM3 to the set {t, f, b}. The
conditions that a valuation for RM3 must satisfy differ from the conditions that
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Table 2. Hilbert-style formulation of RM3
Axiom Schemas :
A⊃ A
(A⊃B)⊃ ((B ⊃ C)⊃ (A⊃ C))
A⊃ ((A⊃B)⊃B)
(A⊃ (A⊃B))⊃ (A⊃B)
(A ∧B)⊃ A
(A ∧B)⊃B
((A⊃B) ∧ (A⊃ C))⊃ (A⊃ (B ∧ C))
A⊃ (A ∨ B)
Rules of Inference :
A A⊃B
B
B ⊃ (A ∨B)
((A⊃ C) ∧ (B ⊃ C))⊃ ((A ∨B)⊃C)
(A ∧ (B ∨ C))⊃ ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C))
¬¬A⊃A
(A⊃ ¬B)⊃ (B ⊃ ¬A)
A⊃ (A⊃ A)
A ∨ (A⊃B)
A B
A ∧B
a valuation for LP⊃ must satisfy only with respect to implication:
ν(A ⊃B) =


b if ν(A) = b and ν(B) = b
t if ν(A) = f or ν(B) = t
f otherwise.
The logical consequence relation of RM3 is also based on the idea that a
valuation ν satisfies a formula A if ν(A) ∈ {t, b}, but is adapted to the different
kind of implication found in RM3. We have that Γ ⊢RM3 A iff for every valuation
ν, either ν(A′) = f for some A′ ∈ Γ , or ν(A) = t, or ν(A′) = b for all A′ ∈ Γ
and ν(A) = b.
By results from [12,13], it is easy to see that RM3 has the four properties
that make it an ideal paraconsistent logic in the sense of [12] as well.
The implication connective of LP⊃, here written⊃∗, can be defined in RM3 by
A⊃∗ B = B ∨ (A⊃B)
and the other way round, the implication connective ⊃ of RM3 can be defined
in LP⊃ by
A⊃B = (A⊃∗ B) ∧ (¬B ⊃∗ ¬A)
(see e.g. [16]). Hence, RM3 has the same expressive power as LP
⊃. To increase
the expressive power, RM3 can be enriched with a constant for f in the same
way as LP⊃ is enriched with a constant for f in Section 3. In the resulting logic,
like in LP⊃,F, the consistency of a formula A can be represented by the formula
(A⊃ F) ∨ (¬A⊃ F).
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6 Da Costa’s Paraconsistent Logics Cn
In [27], da Costa proposes the paraconsistent propositional logics Cn, for n > 0.
In these logics, paraconsistency is obtained by adopting weak forms of negations.
These forms of negation are, to a certain extent, duals of the weak form of
negation found in intuitionistic logic: if something is false then its negation must
be true, but if something is true then its negation may be true as well. In the
case that something is true, further conditions are imposed, but they never have
the effect that its negation must be true. In this way, the logics in question allow
for contradictory formulas to be true.
A formula of the form A ∧ ¬A is a contradictory formula. If the formula
¬(A ∧ ¬A) is true, then A is called a well-behaved formula of degree 1; if in
addition the formula ¬(¬(A∧¬A)∧¬¬(A∧¬A)) is true, then A is called a well-
behaved formula of degree 2; etc. We introduce abbreviations to express that
a formula is a well-behaved formula of degree n, for n > 0. The abbreviations
A(n), for n > 0, are recursively defined as follows: A(1) stands for A1, A(n+1)
stands for A(n) ∧ An+1, where the auxiliary abbreviations An, for n ≥ 0, are
recursively defined as follows: A0 stands for A, An+1 stands for ¬(An ∧ ¬An).
A Hilbert-style formulation of Cn is given in Table 3. The axiom schemas
Table 3. Hilbert-style formulation of Cn
Axiom Schemas :
A⊃ (B ⊃ A)
(A⊃B)⊃ ((A⊃ (B ⊃ C))⊃ (A⊃ C))
(A ∧B)⊃ A
(A ∧B)⊃B
A⊃ (B ⊃ (A ∧B))
A⊃ (A ∨ B)
B ⊃ (A ∨ B)
(A⊃ C)⊃ ((B ⊃ C)⊃ ((A ∨B)⊃ C))
Rule of Inference :
A A⊃B
B
A ∨ ¬A
¬¬A⊃ A
B(n) ⊃ ((A⊃B)⊃ ((A⊃¬B)⊃ ¬A))
(A(n) ∧ B(n))⊃ (A⊃B)(n)
(A(n) ∧ B(n))⊃ (A ∧B)(n)
(A(n) ∧ B(n))⊃ (A ∨B)(n)
on the left-hand side of Table 3 and the single inference rule (modus ponens)
constitute a Hilbert-style formulation of the positive fragment of intuitionistic
propositional logic. The third axiom schema on the right-hand side expresses that
the version of reductio ad absurdum that is found in a Hilbert-style formulation
of full of intuitionistic propositional logic, viz. (A⊃B)⊃ ((A⊃¬B)⊃¬A), works
provided that B is a well-behaved formula of degree n. The last three axiom
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schemas say that formulas composed of well-behaved formulas of degree n are
well-behaved formulas of degree n as well. If we add the axiom schema ¬(A∧¬A),
which is called the law of noncontradiction, to the given Hilbert-style formulation
of Cn, then we get a Hilbert-style formulation of classical propositional logic (see
e.g. [31]).
The following outline of the semantics of Cn is based on [28]. Like in the
cases of LP⊃ and RM3, meanings are assigned to the formulas of Cn by means
of valuations. However, different from valuations for LP⊃ and RM3, valuations
for Cn are functions from the set of all formulas of Cn to the set {t, f} (like in
the case of classical propositional logic). The conditions that a valuation for Cn
must satisfy differ from the conditions that a valuation for classical propositional
logic must satisfy only with respect to negation:
ν(¬A) = t if ν(A) = f
ν(A) = t if ν(¬¬A) = t
ν(A) = f if ν(A(n)) = t and ν(A⊃B) = t and ν(A⊃ ¬B) = t
ν((A ⊃B)(n)) = t if ν(A(n)) = t and ν(B(n)) = t
ν((A ∧B)(n)) = t if ν(A(n)) = t and ν(B(n)) = t
ν((A ∨B)(n)) = t if ν(A(n)) = t and ν(B(n)) = t.
With these unusual conditions, there exist valuations that assign the truth
value t to at least one contradictory formula. Clearly, these conditions are noth-
ing else but semantic counterparts of the axiom schemas in which the negation
connective occurs. Therefore, they do not help in gaining a better insight into the
negation connective of Cn. At best, these conditions confirm the feeling that the
negation connective of Cn is not really a contrary forming operator. By the un-
usual conditions, unlike the valuations for LP⊃ and RM3, the valuations for Cn
are not fully determined by the truth values that they assign to the propositional
variables. That is, negation is made non-truth-functional in Cn.
Like the logical consequence relation of classical propositional logic, the log-
ical consequence relation of Cn is based on the idea that a valuation ν satisfies
a formula A if ν(A) = t. We have that Γ ⊢Cn A iff for every valuation ν, either
ν(A′) = f for some A′ ∈ Γ or ν(A) = t.
The logical consequence relation of Cn is included in the logical consequence
relation of classical propositional logic and the implication connective of Cn is
such that the classical deduction theorem holds (see e.g. [31]). However, max-
imal paraconsistency relative to classical logic and absolute strongly maximal
paraconsistency are not properties of Cn (see e.g. [24,18]). Consequently, Cn is
not an ideal paraconsistent logic in the sense of [12].
Although the negation connective of Cn is non-truth-functional, the truth-
functional negation connective of classical propositional logic, here written ¬∗,
can be defined in Cn by ¬∗A = ¬A ∧ A
(n) (see e.g. [28]).
Little is known about the connections between the logics Cn and the other
paraconsistent logics discussed in this note. In [24], Carnielli and others intro-
duce several classes of paraconsistent logics, including the class of LFIs (Logics
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of Formal Inconsistency) and the class of dC-systems. The class of dC-systems
is a subclass of the class of LFIs. The logics Cn are dC-systems. The logic LP
⊃
is not even an LFI, because connectives for consistency and inconsistency must
be definable in an LFI. However, the logics LP⊃,F and LP⊃,F,B are dC-systems.
An interesting collection of thousands of dC-systems with maximal paraconsis-
tency relative to classical logic and absolute strongly maximal paraconsistency
are identified in [24]. Any of the dC-systems in question can be conservatively
translated into LP⊃,F and LP⊃,F,B.6 However, because maximal paraconsistency
relative to classical logic and absolute strongly maximal paraconsistency are not
properties of them, the logics Cn do not belong to the collection.
7 Jaskows´ki’s Paraconsistent Logic D2
In [42,41], Jas´kowski proposes the paraconsistent logic D2.
7 Jas´kowski calls this
logic a discussive logic. His basic idea is to take true as true according to the
position of some person engaged in a discussion. True in this sense can be thought
of as true in some possible world, namely the world of some person’s position.
Thus, both A and ¬A can be true without an arbitrary formula B being true.
Initially, D2 was presented as a modal logic in disguise.
A Hilbert-style formulation of D2 is given in Table 4. This formulation is
Table 4. Hilbert-style formulation of D2
Axiom Schemas :
A⊃ (B ⊃ A)
(A⊃ (B ⊃C))⊃ ((A⊃B)⊃ (A⊃ C))
(A ∧B)⊃ A
(A ∧B)⊃B
(A⊃B)⊃ ((A⊃ C)⊃ (A⊃ (B ∧ C)))
A⊃ (A ∨B)
B ⊃ (A ∨B)
(A⊃ C)⊃ ((B ⊃ C)⊃ ((A ∨ B)⊃ C))
A ∨ (A⊃B)
Rule of Inference :
A A⊃B
B
¬(¬A ∧ ¬¬A ∧ ¬(A ∨ ¬A))
¬(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬(A ∨B))⊃
¬(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C ∧ ¬(A ∨B ∨ C))
¬(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C ∧ ¬(A ∨B ∨ C))⊃
¬(¬A ∧ ¬C ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬(A ∨ C ∨B))
¬(¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C ∧ ¬(A ∨B ∨ C))⊃
((A ∨B ∨ ¬C)⊃ (A ∨B))
¬(¬A ∧ ¬B)⊃ (A ∨B)
(A ∨ (B ∨ ¬B))⊃ ¬(¬A ∧ ¬(B ∨ ¬B))
6 For a characterization of the dC-systems in question and a definition of conservative
translation, see [24].
7 The cited publications are translations of Polish editions published in 1948 and 1949.
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taken from [25]. Various axiom schemas from Table 4 are rather unusual as axiom
schemas. However, they are all schemas of tautologies of classical propositional
logic.
The following outline of the semantics of D2 is based on [25]. Unlike in the
cases of LP⊃, RM3 and Cn, meanings are assigned to the formulas of D2 by
means of pairs (W, ν) where W is a non-empty set of worlds and ν is a function
from the cartesian product of the set of all formulas of D2 and the set W to the
set {t, f} such that for all formulas A and B of D2:
ν(A ⊃B,w) =
{
t if for all w′ ∈W, ν(A,w′) = f or ν(B,w) = t
f if for some w′ ∈W, ν(A,w′) = t and ν(B,w) = f,
ν(A ∧B,w) =
{
t if ν(A,w) = t and for some w′ ∈W, ν(B,w′) = t
f if ν(A,w) = f or for all w′ ∈W, ν(B,w′) = f,
ν(A ∨B,w) =
{
t if ν(A,w) = t or ν(B,w) = t
f if ν(A,w) = f and ν(B,w) = f,
ν(¬A,w) =
{
t if ν(A,w) = f
f if ν(A,w) = t.
These pairs are called discussive structures. A discussive structure is essentially
the same as a Kripke structure of which the accessibility relation includes every
pair of worlds. The truth-conditions and falsehood-conditions for the logical
connectives become the classical ones if the number of worlds is restricted to one.
The conditions for the implication connective and the conjunction connective
reveal their modal nature clearly.
The logical consequence relation of D2 is based on the idea that a discussive
structure (W, ν) satisfies a formula A if ν(A,w) = t for some w ∈ W . We have
that Γ ⊢D2 A iff for every discussive structure (W, ν), either ν(A
′, w′) = f for all
w′ ∈W for some A′ ∈ Γ or ν(A,w) = t for some w ∈W .
The logical consequence relation of D2 is included in the logical consequence
relation of classical propositional logic and the implication connective of D2 is
such that the classical deduction theorem holds (see e.g. [25]). It is unknown to
me whether maximal paraconsistency relative to classical logic and/or absolute
strongly maximal paraconsistency are properties of D2 and consequently whether
D2 is an ideal paraconsistent logic in the sense of [12].
Little is known about the connections between the logic D2 and the other
paraconsistent logics discussed in this note. Like LP⊃, D2 is not even an LFI. If
D2 is enriched with the necessity operator  satisfying the axioms of S5, which
is the modal operator used in [42,41] to explain D2, we get an LFI.
8 The Annotated Logics Pτ
In [57], Subrahmanian takes the first step towards the paraconsistent proposi-
tional logics called Pτ [32]. Here, τ is some triple (|τ |,≤,∼), where (|τ |,≤) is a
complete lattice of (object-level) truth values and ∼ is a function ∼: |τ | → |τ |
that gives the meaning of negation in Pτ . A typical case is the one where
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|τ | = {n, t, f ,b}, n ≤ x, x ≤ b, x 6≤ ∼(x) if x ∈ {t, f}, ∼(t) = f , ∼(f) = t, and
∼(x) = x if x ∈ {n,b}. Pτ is called an annotated logic. In Pτ , propositional
variables are annotated with an element from |τ |. An annotated propositional
variable Pλ, where P is an ordinary propositional variable and λ ∈ |τ |, expresses
that it is believed that P ’s truth value is at least λ.
We use the symbols ⊥ and ⊤ to denote the bottom element and the top
element, respectively, of the complete lattice (|τ |,≤). Moreover, we write
⊔n
i=1 λi,
where λ1, . . . , λn ∈ |τ |, for the least upper bound of the set {λ1, . . . , λn} with
respect to ≤.
We also introduce abbreviations for multiple negations. The abbreviations
¬nA, for n ≥ 0, are recursively defined as follows: ¬0A stands for A and ¬n+1A
stands for ¬(¬nA). A formula which is not of the form ¬nPλ, where Pλ is an
annotated propositional variable, is called a complex formula.
A Hilbert-style formulation of Pτ is given in Table 5. In this table, F and
Table 5. Hilbert-style formulation of Pτ
Axiom Schemas :
A⊃ (B ⊃ A)
(A⊃ (B ⊃ C))⊃ ((A⊃B)⊃ (A⊃ C))
((A⊃B)⊃ A)⊃ A
(A ∧ B)⊃ A
(A ∧ B)⊃B
A⊃ (B ⊃ (A ∧ B))
A⊃ (A ∨B)
B ⊃ (A ∨B)
(A⊃ C)⊃ ((B ⊃ C)⊃ ((A ∨B)⊃ C))
Rule of Inference :
A A⊃B
B
(F ⊃G)⊃ ((F ⊃ ¬G)⊃ ¬F )
F ⊃ (¬F ⊃ A)
F ∨ ¬F
P⊥
¬n+1Pλ ≡¬
nP∼(λ)
Pλ ⊃ Pµ if λ ≥ µ
Pλ1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pλn ⊃ Pλ if λ =
⊔n
i=1 λi
G range over all complex formulas of Pτ , P ranges over propositional variables,
and λ, µ, λ1, . . . , λn range over |τ |. This formulation is based on the formula-
tion of Qτ , the first-order counterpart of Pτ , given in [3]. The axiom schemas
on the left-hand side of Table 5 and the single inference rule (modus ponens)
constitute a Hilbert-style formulation of the positive fragment of classical propo-
sitional logic. The first three axiom schemas on the right-hand side of Table 5
are the usual axiom schemas for negation in a Hilbert-style formulation of classi-
cal propositional logic, but here their possible instances are restricted. The last
four axiom schemas on the right-hand side of Table 5 are special axiom schemas
concerning formulas of the forms Pλ and ¬
n+1Pλ.
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The following outline of the semantics of Pτ is based on [3]. Like in the cases
of LP⊃, RM3 and Cn, meanings are assigned to the formulas of Pτ by means
of valuations. Like in the cases of Cn, valuations for Pτ are functions from the
set of all formulas of Pτ to the set {t, f}. A valuation for Pτ is such that for all
formulas A and B of Pτ , all complex formulas F of Pτ , and all propositional
variables P :
ν(A ⊃B) =
{
t if ν(A) = f or ν(B) = t
f if ν(A) = t and ν(B) = f,
ν(A ∧B) =
{
t if ν(A) = t and ν(B) = t
f if ν(A) = f or ν(B) = f,
ν(A ∨B) =
{
t if ν(A) = t or ν(B) = t
f if ν(A) = f and ν(B) = f,
ν(¬F ) =
{
t if ν(F ) = f
f if ν(F ) = t,
ν(¬n+1Pλ) =
{
t if ν(¬nP∼(λ)) = t
f if ν(¬nP∼(λ)) = f,
ν(Pλ) =
{
t if for some µ ≥ λ, ν(Pµ) = t
f if for all µ ≥ λ, ν(Pµ) = f.
The classical truth-conditions and falsehood-conditions for the logical connec-
tives are retained except for the negation connective. There are special conditions
for the occurrences of the negation connective in formulas of the form ¬n+1Pλ.
Like the logical consequence relation of Cn, the logical consequence relation
of Pτ is based on the idea that a valuation ν satisfies a formula A if ν(A) = t.
We have that Γ ⊢Pτ A iff for every valuation ν, either ν(A
′) = f for some A′ ∈ Γ
or ν(A) = t.
The properties that make a paraconsistent logic ideal in the sense of [12] are
unmeaning in the case of Pτ , because its language is substantially deviating due
to the annotated propositional variables.
The negation connective of classical propositional logic, here written ¬∗, can
be defined in Pτ by ¬∗A = A⊃ ((A ⊃A) ∧ ¬(A ⊃A)) (see e.g. [3]).
It seems that nothing is known about the connections between the logic Pτ
and the other paraconsistent logics discussed in this note. This is not completely
unexpected, because the language of Pτ is substantially deviating.
9 Paraconsistent Deontic Logics
Legal reasoning is reasoning in the presence of inconsistent information and rea-
soning concerned with normative expressions such as obligatory, permissible, and
prohibited. This calls for a paraconsistent deontic logic. Because paraconsistent
deontic logics have not been investigated extensively, only one is discussed in
some detail here. The logic concerned is called DLP⊃,F because it is a deontic
logic based on LP⊃,F. It is essentially the same logic as the deontic logic DLFI1
proposed in [26].
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DLP⊃,F has the connectives of LP⊃,F and in addition an obligation connec-
tive O. A formulation of this logic is obtained by adding to the Hilbert-style
formulation of LP⊃ given in Table 1 the axiom schema F ⊃ A and the deontic
axiom schemas and rule of inference given in Table 6. Of course, the additional
Table 6. Deontic axiom schemas and rule of inference for DLP⊃,F
Axiom Schemas :
O(A⊃B)⊃ (OA⊃OB)
OF ⊃ F
Rule of Inference :
A is a theorem
OA is a theorem
rule of inference does not belong in a genuine Hilbert-style formulation of a logic.
Like in LP⊃, the standard deduction theorem holds in DLP⊃,F.
Unlike in the case of LP⊃, but like in the case of other modal logics, meanings
are assigned to the formulas of DLP⊃,F by means of triples (W,R, ν) where W
is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R ⊆W ×W is an accessibility relation for
which it holds that for all w ∈ W there exists a w′ ∈ W such that wRw′, and
ν is a function from the cartesian product of the set of all formulas of DLP⊃,F
and the set W to the set {t, f, b} such that for all formulas A and B of DLP⊃,F:
ν(A⊃B,w) =
{
t if ν(A,w) = f
ν(B,w) otherwise,
ν(A ∧B,w) =


t if ν(A,w) = t and ν(B,w) = t
f if ν(A,w) = f or ν(B,w) = f
b otherwise,
ν(A ∨B,w) =


t if ν(A,w) = t or ν(B,w) = t
f if ν(A,w) = f and ν(B,w) = f
b otherwise,
ν(¬A,w) =


t if ν(A,w) = f
f if ν(A,w) = t
b otherwise,
ν(F, w) = f,
ν(OA,w) =


t if for all w′ ∈W with wRw′, ν(A,w′) = t
f if for some w′ ∈W with wRw′, ν(A,w′) = f
b otherwise.
These triples are called three-valued Kripke structures. The truth-conditions and
falsehood-conditions for the logical connectives ⊃, ∧, ∨ and ¬ are the ones used
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in the semantics of LP⊃ for each possible world. The conditions for the obligation
connective reveals its modal nature clearly.
The logical consequence relation of DLP⊃,F is based on the idea that a three-
valued Kripke structure (W,R, ν) satisfies a formula A if ν(A,w) ∈ {t, b} for all
w ∈ W . We have that Γ ⊢DLP⊃,F A iff for every three-valued Kripke structure
(W,R, ν) and w ∈ W , either ν(A′, w) = f for some A′ ∈ Γ or ν(A,w) ∈ {t, b}.
DLP⊃,F is a deontically paraconsistent logic, i.e. there exist sets Γ of for-
mulas of DLP⊃,F and formulas A of DLP⊃,F such that not for all formulas B
of DLP⊃,F, Γ ∪ {OA,O¬A} ⊢DLP⊃,F OB. A formula A of DLP
⊃,F is called
deontically inconsistent if O¬((A ⊃ F) ∨ (¬A ⊃ F)). From contradictory obliga-
tions OA and O¬A, it can be inferred that A is deontically inconsistent: for
all sets Γ of formulas of DLP⊃,F and all formulas A of DLP⊃,F, we have that
Γ ⊢DLP⊃,F OA⊃ (O¬A ⊃O¬((A ⊃ F) ∨ (¬A ⊃ F))).
Deontic logics based on RM3 and C1 are devised in a similar way in [48]
and [30], respectively.8 Published work on deontic logics based on D2 and Pτ
seems to be non-existent. As far as modal logics based on Pτ are concerned, all
published work seems to be on epistemic logics (see e.g. [1]). In fact, virtually all
published work on paraconsistent modal logics seems to be on epistemic logics
based on Pτ .
10 Belief Revision and Related Issues
It is reasonable to assume that legal reasoning is done by rational persons who
revise their beliefs in the light of new information. The AGM theory of belief
revision [4,39] is a theory about the dynamics of the beliefs of a rational person
that is based on the representation of beliefs as formulas of some logic. Most of
the work on belief revision is based on the AGM theory. Much of this work takes
for granted that the beliefs of a rational person must be consistent. However,
motivated by the need to account for belief revision in the presence of inconsistent
beliefs, some work has been done on the adaptation of the AGM theory to
paraconsistent logics.
In [56], the AGM theory is adapted to a fragment of the logic BL⊃ mentioned
at the end of Section 4 enriched with constants for t and f and it is shown that the
adaptation has only minor consequences. A similar adaptation is found in [46].
In [38], it is shown how an adaptation of the AGM theory to the same fragment
of BL⊃ can be obtained via a translation to classical logic. In [29], the AGM
theory is adapted to the logics Cn. In [47], a new theory of belief revision for R,
a relevance logic weaker than RM3, is developed and it is sketched how this new
theory is connected with the AGM theory. The new theory is also applicable to
RM3. A very general model of belief revision, in which all postulates of the AGM
theory fail, is proposed in [54]. In [58], a survey of proposed adaptations of the
AGM theory for non-classical logics, including paraconsistent logics, is provided.
8 In fact, a family of modal logics based on RM3, including a deontic logic is devised
in [48].
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In [7,8,9], a general framework is developed for reasoning where conclusions
are drawn according to the most plausible interpretations,9 i.e. the interpreta-
tions that are as close as possible to the set of hypotheses, and also as faithful
as possible to the more reliable or important hypotheses in this set. This kind
of reasoning emerges for example in belief revision with minimal change and
in integration of information from different autonomous sources. It also encom-
passes adaptive reasoning, i.e. reasoning where, if a set of hypotheses can be
split up into a consistent part and an inconsistent part, every assertion that is
not related to the inconsistent part and classically follows from the consistent
part, is deduced from the whole set. It is very likely that the kind of reasoning
covered by the framework occurs in legal reasoning as well. The framework fo-
cusses on the consequence relations of logics for this kind of reasoning and it is
based on two principles: a distance-based preference relation on interpretations
and prioritized hypotheses.
A well-known paraconsistent logic in which a preference relation on inter-
pretations underlies the consequence relation is LPm [53] (minimally inconsis-
tent LP). In [44], variants of LP⊃,F,B are studied in which a preference relation
on interpretations underlies the consequence relation. A characteristic property
of logics in which a preference relation on interpretations underlies the conse-
quence relation is that they are paraconsistent, even if the point of departure is
a non-paraconsistent logic. For the sake of completeness, we mention that the
above-mentioned framework generalizes earlier work on preferential reasoning
presented in [11]. The work on preferential reasoning presented in [19] seems to
originate from that earlier work as well.
11 Concluding remarks
The discussions of the different paraconsistent logics included in the survey do
not give known theoretical details about them that are not relevant to a basic
understanding of them or their interrelationships. The details concerned can be
found in the cited publications. The amount of detail that is given in this note
differs from one logic to another for the simple reason that what is known about
the questions concerned differs from one logic to another.
Not all paraconsistent logics discussed in this note have been investigated in
an equally extensive way. LP⊃ has been investigated most extensively and D2
has been investigated least extensively. However, D2 is mentioned in virtually
all publications on paraconsistent logics. It seems that the logics Cn are criti-
cized most. It also seems that, with the exception of paraconsistent annotated
logics, the applications of paraconsistent logics are only looked for and found in
mathematics.
Paraconsistent annotated logics stem from logic programming in the presence
of inconsistent information (see e.g. [23]). Other applications of paraconsistent
annotated logics include database query answering [6], negotiation in multi-agent
9 In the case of propositional logics, the interpretations are usually valuations.
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systems [40], expert system diagnosis [33] and robot control [2] in the presence
of inconsistent information. In some of these applications, it is the case that
|τ | = [0, 1] × [0, 1]. In those cases, the logic concerned has some characteristics
of a fuzzy logic.
Most work on how to choose among the different paraconsistent logics focuses
on the logical consequence relation of the logics. In [22], properties of the logical
equivalence relation turn out to be of major concern in choosing a paraconsis-
tent logic to build a process algebra that allows for dealing with contradictory
states on. The properties of the logical equivalence relation concerned cause an
extensive reduction of the number of paraconsistent logics to choose from (see
also [49]). The chosen logic is the logic LP⊃,F mentioned in Section 3.
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